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2 Fighting in the Desert? Conflict and Resource 
Management in East African Drylands 
Tobias Hagmann6 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Expert opinion has it that climate change is a major cause of violent conflict in the semi-arid and arid 
lowlands of sub-Saharan Africa. Prominent politicians and public intellectuals have identified climate 
change as a culprit of inter-group violence in East African drylands. Asked about the impact of land 
degradation and desertification on the Darfur conflict, Jeffrey Sachs, the director of Columbia 
University’s Earth Institute, determined that ‘but for the environmental stress; I doubt this would 
have exploded’ (Rosenthal 2007). Sachs is not the only one to point fingers to the alleged nexus 
between climate change and political upheaval. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) chairman Rajendra K. Pachauri recently speculated that ‘climate change has 
the potential to be a problem for the maintenance of peace’ (Flynn 2008). Margaret Beckett, the 
former British Foreign Security, established that ‘a failing climate means more failed states’ (Marcus 
2006). Following the publication of major global environmental assessment reports such as the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005), the British government sponsored Stern Review (Stern 
2006) and the IPCC (Boko et al. 2007) numerous commentators have argued that climate change 
has and will fuel conflicts, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Although little validated scientific 
knowledge exists about the links between climate change and conflict (Nordås & Gleditsch 2007), 
authors have warned about the ‘double-headed problem of climate change and violent conflict’ 
(Smith & Vivekananda 2007:4), which developing countries will face in the future. 
The alarmist rhetoric about the threatening impacts of climate change as drivers of violence in 
dryland sub-Saharan Africa rejoins earlier debates about the causal links between environmental 
degradation, land use change and conflict in Africa (Suliman 1999). Initially, the discussion about 
resource-based conflicts in African lowlands was triggered by fears that increasing desertification 
and the negative impacts of global environmental change disrupt pastoral livelihoods, diminish life-
sustaining resources and thereby exacerbate violent conflicts (Baechler 1994). While individual 
studies found ample evidence for quantitative (frequency) and qualitative (dynamics) changes in 
resource related conflicts in pastoral areas, the causal links between environmental change, conflict 
and cooperation remain strongly contested (Barnett 2001, Dalby 2004, Hagmann 2005, Peluso & 
Watts 2001). Much of the environmental conflict literature - most prominently Homer-Dixon (1999) -
transpired the neo-Malthusian assumption according to which demographic growth coupled with 
environmental degradation leads to resource scarcity, which in turn fosters inter-group conflict. 
While this rather outdated neo-Malthusian notion of environmentally induced conflict has been 
severely criticized on methodological and conceptual grounds (Gleditsch & Urdal 2002), current 
debates about climate change have once again rehabilitated the idea that scarcity of renewable 
resources, namely land and water, leads to conflict. This scenario is supported by climatologists who 
predict that climate change will reduce the length of growing seasons, add pressure on water 
availability and accessibility, increase deforestation and desertification and lead to less and more 
erratic rainfall in African drylands (Boko et al. 2007). 
This paper refutes the idea that violent conflict in pastoral areas can be understood as a direct 
function of resource availability as determined by climate change. Instead of reiterating theoretical 
critiques to the environmental conflict thesis and scarcity driven explanations of violent conflict 
fostered by climate change  (Hagmann 2005), I draw attention to how pastoralists  manage conflicts 
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and resources. While past and present debates have been obsessed with tracing the causal links 
between a given condition of the biophysical environment and violent conflict, few authors have 
taken into account conflict and resource management institutions as dependent variables that 
account for the emergence of organized violence in semi-arid lowlands. My central proposition here 
is that relations of both conflict and cooperation over natural resources must be analysed to 
understand and make a meaningful contribution to conflict transformation. This requires an 
engagement with the ecological, socio-economic and political characteristics of pastoral production 
systems as they are typically found in the East African lowlands and border regions. 
2.2 Institutions for conflict and resource management7 
Which institutions shape pastoralists’ conflict and resource management practices in the East African 
lowlands? To answer this question characteristic features of the ecological and political space in 
which transhumant livestock keeping is embedded must be recalled. It is vital to understand pastoral 
conflict and resource management strategies on the background of their wider natural and social 
context. In this respect the ‘new range ecology’ school has challenged dominant conceptions of 
rangeland management and ecology and pastoral development (Behnke 1994, Ellis & Swift 1988, 
Niamir-Fuller 1999a, Scoones 1996). New range ecology scholars have refuted historically popular 
views according to which nomadic pastoralism is economically irrational and ecologically unsound. 
By drawing attention to the non-equilibrial nature of arid and semi-arid ecosystems, they have 
argued that ecosystems regularly change from one condition to another (Niamir-Fuller 1999b). 
According to this interpretation, highly variable rainfall, vegetation and resource consumption 
patterns must be viewed not as irregularities, but as defining features of African and other drylands. 
Despite new range ecologists’ fundamental rethinking of the logic that governs human-nature 
interactions in dryland pastoralist production systems, policy-making in pastoral areas often 
continues to be informed by assumptions of herders’ economic irrationality as famously stated in 
Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’ writing. 
New range ecology’s central tenets can be summarized as follows. First, extensive resource use as 
evidenced by high livestock mobility and opportunistic grazing is a rational response to the 
seasonally and spatially variable resource availability that is so characteristic of drylands (Behnke 
1994). Second, in their daily management decisions pastoralists face different types of uncertainty as 
a result of drylands’ climatic and ecological variability. Third, pastoral communities’ land tenure rules 
reflect the existence of overlapping and dynamic resource claims that do not fit static boundaries of 
clearly demarcated property rights. Fourth, property and use rights of key natural resources of the 
pastoral economy are highly socialized and are part of layered property rights regimes. Finally, 
resource ownership in pastoral production systems manifests itself in negotiated access rights 
instead of permanent property rights. These insights of the new range ecology school are of crucial 
importance when gauging the effectiveness of conflict and resource management institutions. One 
can assume that practices, patterns and policies that are in line with drylands’ non-equilibrial nature 
and their highly socialized property rights are more amenable for peaceful conflict and resource 
management than those practices, patterns and policies that contradict or disrupt them. 
Pastoralist institutions may contribute to conflict prevention and transformation for different 
reasons, but primarily because they enable cooperation and because they determine resource access. 
This point is made by Cleaver (2002:15) who argues that ’institutions of co-operation are embedded 
in everyday relations, networks of reciprocity and the negotiation of cultural norms’. An example 
illustration of this is provided by Ensminger (1990) whose ethnography of Orma herders, their 
changing property rights and incorporation into the Kenyan state, underlines how institutions enable  
 
______________________ 
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more cooperative forms of exchange. Goldschmidt’s study of tribal societies’ ‘institutions of peace’ 
highlights how pastoralists resolve inter-group competition and tension non-violently. Similarly, 
institutional rules play an important role in regulating cooperation and competition over the use of 
common-pool resources such as rangelands (Ostrom 1990). Consequently, a host of diverse and 
interacting institutions mediate relations between social actors and their natural environment as 
well as the way these actors manage natural resources (Leach et al. 1999). 
Bearing in mind these theoretical tenets, it becomes clear that conflict and resource management 
institutions have different purposes and that they are an essential part of the everyday management 
of pastoral affairs (Swift 1996). For example, conflict resolution, marriage or inheritance rules are as 
relevant for resource management as they are to govern inter-group, gender and family relations. In 
cases where violent conflict has become protracted, a reorientation of the institutional rules of 
resource use is often a precondition to allow pastoralists access to water points and rangelands 
(Lane & Moorehead 1996). Livestock keepers manage conflicts by establishing alliances, through ad 
hoc adaptations, reciprocity as well as informal sanctions or simply by avoiding disputes with 
competitors (Braukämper 2000, Niamir-Fuller 1999a). Resource management institutions are thus an 
integral part of everyday conflict prevention, management and settlement. In return, pastoralists’ 
conflict prevention, management and settlement strategies are an integral part of their everyday 
natural resource management practices. 
A persistent intellectual challenge to institutionalist interpretations of sub-Saharan politics and 
ecology is the fundamental opposition that is often drawn, both in scholarly and in folk discourse, 
between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ institutions. For example, Leach et al. (1999) distinguishes 
between ‘formal institutions’ such as statutory law, which requires exogenous enforcement, and 
‘informal institutions’ such as customary norms, which are endogenously enforced. Although many 
authors have criticized this static differentiation as unhelpful, it remains a powerful schema to 
interpret the history, rationality and functioning of institutions in developing countries. In her 
sophisticated discussion of this topic Cleaver (2001:29) warns against opposing a ‘realm of 
“traditional” informal, culturally and socially embedded institutions’ to ‘a “modern” domain of 
rationally designed committees and formal structures’. Given the adaptability of customary norms 
and practices on the one hand, and the often ‘invented’ nature of ‘traditions’ on the other hand 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), it seems more prudent to define institutions not in dichotomous terms, 
but as historically evolving norms and practices that contain multiple influences. 
This latter point is strongly made by legal pluralism scholars who emphasize the interconnectedness 
of plural social and normative orders (Merry 1992) and the necessity to consider ‘the whole 
configuration of legal plurality’ (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2003:305). While the state claims a 
monopoly of legal regulation over society, bureaucratic, customary, religious and kinship institutions 
coexist in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, offering multiple procedures and repertoires for conflict 
management. Dialectic relations exist between socially embedded rules (or what is commonly 
referred to as ‘customs’), customary norms recognized by the state and statutory law (von Benda-
Beckmann 2001). In parallel, these different legal repertoires not only contradict each other, but 
frequently constitute ‘overlapping and polycentric forms of governance’ (Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan 
2001:15) that influence conflict and resource management. The following section summarily reviews 
the contemporary dynamics of these conflict and resource management practices in greater detail 
and with reference to East African drylands. 
2.3 Transformations of the pastoral political economy 
Violence in pastoral areas must be understood on the background of the numerous long-term 
transformations that affect sub-Saharan African drylands. Herder societies and economies have been 
gradually transformed by population growth, the expansion of agro-pastoralism, the multiplication 
of water points, recurrent draughts, the institutionalization of humanitarian aid, the individualization 
of rangelands, forced and voluntary in-migration and  population movements as well as  increasingly  
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sedentarized lifestyles (Anderson & Broch-Due 1999, Fratkin & McCabe 1999, Little et al. 2001, 
Markakis 2004). Conflicts over dryland resources are embedded in evolving natural resource 
management practices and changing political frameworks that result from these transformations. 
The historical and ongoing diversification of livelihoods and political authorities in extensive 
production systems has weakened internal group cohesion and rendered collective action more 
complex. 
A common denominator of these transformations of the pastoral political economy is the 
commoditization of the biosphere as ‘new’ natural resources are drawn into regional and global 
markets. While East African livestock has been commoditized decades ago in the form of export 
goods (Samatar 1992), a wide range of renewable and non-renewable resources situated or 
produced in the lowlands are currently absorbed by local and transnational economies. In the coastal 
regions of the Horn of Africa dryland forestry, particularly acacia trees used for charcoal production 
has become an important energy source that is sold to Arab Gulf States (Lindenback 2001). 
Intensification of land use for agricultural cultivation and fodder production in increasingly 
individualized and enclosed rangelands is another indicator for commoditization. Across East Africa 
transhumance, seasonal migration and reciprocal grazing rights have been severely undermined by 
the fragmentation of rangelands and the spread of privately owned land enclosures. Similar trends 
are observable in the case of water used for irrigation, animal and human consumption, whose 
access and use often hinges on technological investments that are required for drilling wells or 
pumping water for flood irrigation. Finally, a number of lowland regions including southern Sudan 
and western and eastern Ethiopia hold significant reserves of fossil energy, which are exploited 
commercially. 
Another factor of change in East African pastoral economies is the growing involvement of 
development and humanitarian aid. Following decades of neglect, local and international 
development organizations have recognized pastoralism and drylands as areas of targeted 
intervention in Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. As a response to the devastating droughts that hit the 
Sahel belt in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s donor sponsored relief and rehabilitation programs were 
gradually expanded to the lowlands. Particularly humanitarian aid in the form of food aid has 
become a recurrent phenomenon. In many cases food aid supplements household incomes, but it 
also raises the specter of increasing dependency on donor sponsored ‘hand-outs’ (Sandford & Habtu 
2000). In addition to routine food aid deliveries, Ethiopian pastoral communities are more and more 
benefiting from cash transfers in return for labor based public works, which are hoped to address the 
structural causes of food insecurity and chronic vulnerability. 
Initially celebrated as a policy achievement, the inclusion of pastoralism on the development agenda 
has produced paradoxical outcomes. On the one hand, pastoralism as a lifestyle and economic 
activity has gained public recognition. On the other hand, herders’ interests are represented in 
national capitals by officials and development workers who often do not originate from pastoral 
communities and/or are members of the educated urban elite (Oxby 1999). 
Recent research on pastoral conflicts in East Africa demonstrates that local institutions for conflict 
and resource management are increasingly dominated and transformed by the expanding nation-
state (Hagmann & Alemmaya 2008, Hogg 1997, Salih et al. 2001). This process is not a zero sum 
game as it reconfigures the ways in which the state and pastoral groups engage in politics while the 
historic, but not linear, process of state expansion unfolds in the Horn of Africa’s semi-arid lowlands. 
This finding is in line with Markakis’ (1994:217) earlier observation that the state represents a major 
bone of contention for conflicts in the East African lowlands ‘because it controls the production and 
distribution of material and social resources’. Most inter-personal and inter-group disputes in 
pastoralist areas, both violent and non-violent, are adjudicated by elders. Customary conflict 
resolution institutions often rely on blood compensation payments to reconcile warring groups.  
This is  the case  of  the  Afar  in Djiboutiand Ethiopia (Kassa 2001) the  Karrayu  Oromos  in Ethiopia  
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(Mulugeta 2007), the Somalis in Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya (Lewis 1999 [1961]) or the 
different tribal groups of (partly) Arab descent in Darfur (El-Battahani 2002). 
East African governments have seldom been able to secure lasting peace by recourse to legal means 
or effective policing in their lowland regions. Attempts to expand the outreach of state organs, 
particularly police, courts and jails to more remote areas, have been met with limited success. Often 
local administrations lack popular acceptance and the required resources (transport, armed forces 
etc.) to play a meaningful role as mediators and conflict managers. With the exception of urbanized 
populations, pastoralists in many instances prefer customary conflict resolution institutions over the 
formal justice system to settle disputes. The avoidance of the state’s legal system is particularly 
visible in Ethiopia’s pastoralist areas. To cite an example, Seid and Jotte (2004:12) report that out of 
a total of 215 criminal cases (homicide, attempted murder, armed robbery) observed in 2002 in the 
Korahe zone of Ethiopia’s Somali region only six were dealt with by the courts on the basis of 
statutory law. 
Various recent studies have documented the failure of Ethiopian local and regional administrations 
to provide ‘lasting solutions’ (Gedi 2005:46) to longstanding resource conflicts at communal level. In 
the case of the Boran-Degodia conflict rather than calming the situation government interventions 
‘had the effect of escalating the conflicts’ (Abdullahi 2005:15). The following paradox is thus 
observed; although the state perceives outbreaks of physical violence in its pastoral lowlands - most 
notably cattle raids and associated violence - as a challenge to its sovereignty and monopoly of 
violence, it does not have the appropriate means to resolve these conflicts durably (Mulugeta & 
Hagmann 2008). Furthermore, in their attempts to contain and resolve resource-based and other 
inter-group conflicts, Ethiopian state interventions are spatially limited, inclined towards coercion 
and rarely long-term oriented (Hagmann & Mulugeta 2008). While herders’ customary conflict 
management institutions have been eroded by the transformation of the pastoral economy and 
increasing state incorporation, government sponsored conflict resolution often is not very effective. 
The result is a ‘crisis of reconciliation’ (Abbink 2000) as pastoral communities can rely neither on 
state nor on customary institutions to resolve conflict. 
2.4 Conclusions 
Despite its intuitive logic, the assertion that climate change fosters resource scarcity driven conflicts 
in sub-Saharan African drylands is over simplified. While changing qualitative and quantitative 
parameters of local resource pools certainly have an impact on human behavior, a linear causality 
between the two does not exist. Rather human agency, or what is commonly refereed to as 
‘adaptation’ in the human ecology literature, represents the intervening variable between 
environmental change and inter-group relations. As this paper has demonstrated both theoretically 
and empirically, conflict and resource management institutions and practices determine whether and 
how conflicts (de-)escalate. Although conventional wisdom associates resource scarcity with 
violence in East African lowlands, local practices of resource sharing arrangements often ensure 
peaceful coexistence (Bogale & Korf 2007, Eaton 2008). Changing conflict dynamics in East African 
lowlands are primarily the result of the concomitant break-down of customary institutions and the 
inability of central and local governments to enforce communal property rights. The result are de 
facto open-access tenure regimes that benefit groups with higher bargaining power as they are 
better placed to capture strategic resources of the pastoral economy. 
The analysis of the institutional, social and ecological intricacies of violent conflict in African 
drylands reveals the continuous importance of politics as the main explicative variable for inter-
group tension. Violence among pastoral and agro-pastoral groups must not only be seen in the 
context of changing local institutions and political economy, but is fundamentally political and is 
closely associated with everyday experiences of marginalization, exclusion and oppression. Whilst 
the environmental conflict and climate change conflict hypotheses impute causal power to 
environmental change, political dynamics are as important. Relations  between the state and  pasto- 
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ralists, between herders and farmers, and between competing resource users are conditioned by 
political circumstances that define who is entitled to material opportunities, decision-making and 
representation. Contemporary conflicts in East African lowlands are the product of competition over 
urban real estate, multi-party elections and state budgets as much as struggles over rangelands and 
water wells (Hagmann & Mulugeta 2008). Strategies that aim at conflict transformation must 
consider the variegated nature and modernity of contemporary violence in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Herders do not simply fight over the desert because they are animated by subsistence need, but 
because they pursue politically, culturally and economically rational agendas. 
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